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Bishop Rice's Last Battle for Civil Rights
A Memorandum for the State Historical Society
BY

FRANK SWANCARA*

There appeared in the Rocky Mountain News shortly before Sunday, February 18, 1945, an advertisement stating, in substance, that on
that day the Bishop would, in the name of the Liberal Church, protest
against the witch-hunting clause of House Bill No. 325.
The assailed clause consisted of the words, "although in every case
the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question." Separated
from its context, the clause seems innocent enough, but it immediately
followed a clause providing that persons shall not be "excluded" as witnesses "on account of their opinions on matters of religious belief."
Therefore the bill, if passed, would have invited lawyers to pry into
private and secret "opinions" on the pretext of testing "credibility."
It happens that these clauses were copied from an existing Colorado
statute,' first enacted in 1883. What it meant in 1883 is clear from the
following statement of a New York court in 1858:
"And when the people declared, in their constitution, that 'no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief,' they did not intend to say that some
persons may not have such awful religious opinions as to render them
2
less credible as witnesses than others."So the courts, in 1858, held that even without such statutory permission as given by the Colorado statute, credibility could be tested by
questions on the "opinions" of the witness. The Colorado statute of
1883 simply adopted the New York case law of the time.
The Colorado statute of 1883 is cited in Wigmore on Evidence in
connection with the following text:
"Much less, in these days, should evidence be admitted, not of
cacotheism, but of mere disbelief in a personal Deity, i. e., atheism,
-a belief quite consistent with the strictest sense of moral obligation to speak the truth. Some statutes, however, preserve a permission to use such evidence,-a sop of mediaevalism left to satisfy
those who would otherwise have not consented to abolish theologi3
cal qualifications for the oath. "

If the Colorado legislature of 1883 could not avoid the "sop of mediaevalism," surely the sponsors of the House Bill in 1945 could have done
*Of the Denver bar.
]Sec. 1, Ch. 177, C. S. A.
'Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb. 265. 270.
'Sec. 936 Wigmore on Ev. (2d Ed.).
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so, for Dean Wigmore's text goes on to show that "in these days" some
courts "justly reject" that sop.
During the formation of the New York case law, as existing in
1883, opinions regarding theism, monotheism, and hell were "awful"
to persons holding contrary opinions. However, if a witness belonged
to a politically or socially powerful sect or denomination, then no matter
how "awful" his creed might seem to some, no lawyer dared to impeach
him. 4 Judicial notice was then taken of the liberty of conscience. But if
the witness was thought not accepting theism or monotheism, the New
York courts, as late as 189 1, would not protect him. He could not prove
his "credibility" by showing that he had endured the pains of poverty
for the sake of avoiding debt.
When John Most became a witness he was victimized by the practice sanctioned by case law in New York and by such clause as was placed
in House Bill No. 325. He was unpopular because of a speech on behalf
of the Chicago "anarchists," and spoke of "how they were strangled to
death, not properly hanged."- 5 He was co.nvicted under the "Unlawful
Assemblage Act," and on appeal the highest court dismissed as "frivolous," without discussion, his exception to a question affecting his
opinion on a theological subject.,
In 1903 the same reviewing court considered a case where the impeached witness was a respectable business man. One judge said, in effect,
that-in obedience to stare decisis what was sauce, or poison, to the goose
John Most must also be fed to Mr. Cory. However, two judges thought
it both unconstitutional and unreasonable to permit lawyers to pretend
that they are drawing in question the "credibility" of a witness by inquiring as to his presumably, unpopular opinions on the fundamentals
of predominant creeds.'
The purpose of pretending to test "credibility" by questions on
religious, or anti-religious opinions, is to arouse hostility against the
witness on the part of jurors having contrary opinions. How a juror
may act or react is illustrated by the effect of the following question once
propounded to Upton Sinclair:
"Did you not say 'the Eddy Bible is unadulterated moonshine,' and that the organization is the 'church of the full pocketbook'?" 8
Referring to a juror who had heard that question, and who was "a
Christian Scientist," Col. Van Cise said:
'Corn. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 153 (1834).
'People v. Most, 8 N. Y. Supp. 625 (1890).
'People v. Most, 27 N. E. 970 (1891).
7
Brink v. Stratton, 68 N. E. 148, 63 L. R. A. 182 (1903).
'36-37 Colo. Bar Assn. Rep. (1934), p. 123.
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"Up came the juror like a huge trout from the depths, gone
was his lethargy, and he sat glowering in his chair.' -'
While Bishop Frank H. Rice was practically alone in placing himself on record as opposing the witch-hunting clause in House Bill No.
325, his protest accorded with both the letter and spirit of the state's
Bill of Rights. Section 4 provides that "no person shall be denied any
civil * * * right, privilege or capacity, on account of his opinions concerning religion," which provision is substantially the same as that which
caused the Court of Appeals of Kentucky to say:
"We think that this provision of the constitution not only
permits persons to testify without regard to religious belief or ISbelief, but that it was intended to prevent any inquiry into that
belief for the purpose of affecting credibility.' 10
That decision had the approval of Dean Wigmore. 1
Of course, if House Bill No. 325 had passed, the clause in question
would have been a nullity, as it is in the existing statute. 12 But the
presence of that clause amounts, in effect, to an insult against individuals
having no fear of supernatural punishments, because of implications
against their veracity. 13 As witnesses, they are placed in a list with con4
victed felons.'

Personals
Lt. Col. John C. Street will serve on the staff of Supreme Court
Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief of counsel for the United States in
prosecuting war criminals in Europe. Col. Street was an attorney for the
Burlington Railroad prior to entering the army. Mrs. Street is the former Helen M. Thorp of the Denver bar and former instructor at the
University of Denver School of Law.
Fred N. Holland has been promoted to the rank of major. Maj.
Holland is officer in charge of the fraud section of the field investigations
branch of the office of dependency benefits. This branch in its three years
of activity has saved more than eight million dollars to the government
in the prevention of payments of family allowances to those not entitled
to them.
'Supra note 8 at p. 124.
'°Bush v. Com., 80 Ky. 244 (1882).
'Supra note 3.
"The modern cases cited in note, 95 A. L. R. 723 and supplements.
"Direct aspersions are found in Odell v. Koppee, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 88; Norton v.
Ladd. 4 N. H. 444; and in Stanbro v. Hopkins, cited supra note 2.
14Note the position of the clause, "nor those who have been convicted of crime,"
as it appears in Sec. 1, Ch. 177, C. S. A.

